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MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

PROJECT TROY

REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

VOLUME III

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR	
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MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

PROJECT TROY
REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

VOLUME III
ANNEXES 9 - 18

FEBRUARY 1, 1951

CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

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Annex 9

PERSONNEL FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA AND OTHER BACKWARD AREAS

As is pointed out elsewhere in this report, communication between the United States and the people of Asia is gravely hampered by the prevailing illiteracy, the variety of spoken languages, and the generally low standard of living. Neither printed materials nor radio broadcasts reach an important fraction of the people. Furthermore the material we wish to communicate is complex and unfamiliar. It consists principally of two sorts -- technological methods for improving the standard of living, and the social and political elements of democratic society.

All the foregoing considerations suggest that our best way of communicating with the people of Asia is through face to face contact on a wide scale. We wish therefore to propose the recruiting of a group of American youth willing and able to spend two to four years of their lives in intimate personal contact with the village people of Asia. Their primary task would be the demonstration of suitably modified western techniques of public health and agriculture. If they were the right sort of representative Americans they would also make use of their position to transmit almost automatically American ideas of cooperation in a common job, respect for individual dignity, and the free play of individual initiative.

Admittedly, it will not be easy to find and train a large number of young Americans with the formidable qualifications necessary for such a job. Neither is it easy to find and train a crew for B36 bombers but it has been done. Our future security is just as dependent upon the success of Point 4 as it is upon the effectiveness of strategic bombing and deserves an equally all-out effort. And it will not succeed without such effort. The fact of the matter is that we in the United States are only beginning to realize how difficult it is to transmit our complicated way of life to other cultures.

There has been so much loose talk about the defects of the British Imperial system that we find it far too easy to assume that our supposedly superior intentions will automatically make us succeed where they have failed. This is a ridiculous oversimplification. Actually it is not only the British that have failed; not one of the western powers has found a way to get the eastern peoples out of the vicious circle of overpopulation and underproduction of the necessities of life. Even granting that the primary objective of the colonial powers was exploitation for selfish gain, the accompanying effort to raise the local standard of living and develop a western type of society is very impressive. Astonishingly large numbers of students were sent abroad for prolonged and detailed instruction in western methods, transport systems were set up, legal systems remolded on western models, and local democratic governments were carefully nurtured against the day of independence. In no case, not even that of

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the prize United States showpiece -- the Philippines, did this process lead to a stable society capable of maintaining the progress imposed from without.

The reasons for failure are doubtless complicated and certainly worth much further study. We can note here, however, that all these efforts were posited on the assumption that Westernization could be achieved from the top down. In a way we were deluded by the ease with which the intelligentsia adopted western ways, and we did not see that the more we trained them in our way of thinking the more divorced they became from their own culture. In some flagrant cases, individuals used their newly acquired knowledge to enhance their personal status at home and exploit the underprivileged in their own societies.

This analysis of past efforts, oversimplified though it is, suggests that future enterprises for raising the standard of life in the east must be directed not from the top down but directly at the cultural unit of the east -- the agricultural village. It is here that our proposed corps of American youth would find their essential objective.

These young people would have to be selected with care, fired with a real self-sacrificing enthusiasm, and trained with the same intensity as a crack military corps. Some inducement to enter this unique service could be offered in the form of counting time spent in it as equal to that spent in the universal military training program. More important perhaps would be the sense of engaging in a new experiment in human welfare. The opportunity to learn about foreign areas and peoples would attract still others.

The training program would have, of course, to be elaborated with care and modified on the basis of future experience. Only the general outline can be set down here.

All participants should be trained in what might be called the general aspects of culture contact. Fundamental to this is the point of view that there is no adequate scale upon which cultures can be rated as "better" than others. Differences there assuredly are, but many of the points on which eastern cultures differ from the west may represent better adaptations to local conditions. It should be the business of every member of the proposed corps to adopt an attitude of respect and intelligent inquiry towards the particular culture to which he is assigned. In endeavoring to transmit certain western techniques such as those in public health or agriculture his attitude should be one of a cooperative demonstrator rather than the didactic lecturer. The more he works with his own hands in demonstrating these matters, the better. The fact that past contacts between West and East have been largely of the boss-coolie sort has made it very difficult for the colonial peoples to realize that white men actually do work with their hands when they are in their own country, and that our relative abundance of food and other materials is due to this very fact. Myths of exploitation or magical power flourish in this atmosphere.

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Special training programs will of course have to be tailored to special needs. Most essential is conversational experience in the local language. This may not be as difficult as would appear at first glance. Since the objective is oral communication with people who have relatively limited vocabularies, the complexities of the written oriental languages may be very largely neglected.

Special training would also be necessary in elementary public health, agricultural and engineering techniques but again this training should be kept on a relatively simple level. The problem is one of finding ways to get the local population to integrate simple measures into their regular ways of doing things. In public health, for example, one thinks of latrines rather than sewage disposal plants, protected wells rather than aqueducts, fresh vegetables rather than X-ray tubes and electrocardiographs.

Such matters seem so simple to us that people without experience in "backward areas" underrate the difficulty of introducing the use of a new hoe in an area where a bent stick has been hallowed by thousands of years, or hitching cattle to a plow where cattle have never been used as draft animals because of their divine origin.

There is no doubt that there is plenty for a trained corps of young Americans to do in backward areas. Whether the scheme proposed here can actually meet the need in practice can only be found out by trying. The importance of the problem certainly justifies a pilot project to test the possibilities.

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Annex 10

POPULATION PROBLEMS

Much of the misery and poverty in the so-called backward areas of the world which provide such fertile ground for the growth of communism are only in part related to technological backwardness, economic primitivism, or political inequities. They are the inevitable result of too many people living off too little land. No ingenuity of Marxist dialectic, and no Point Four can reason away or buy off the rules of biology. For a time, increased economic assistance and technical improvement in agriculture and public health will increase the amount of food, but in the not-very-long run these very measures will increase in even greater proportion the number of mouths. It is grossly unfair to the American people to ask them to support a program of Economic Cooperation Administration or Point Four aid if these are designed only to treat the symptoms and neglect the underlying disease. The Voice of America is equally disingenuous if it tries to persuade the people of Asia that America can solve their problems, while the people of America refuse to face frankly the facts of population dynamics.

It is especially unfortunate that so much discussion of population problems centers on the ethics of mechanical contraceptives, a subject that is only remotely relevant to present conditions in the Far East. Indeed, we do not have accurate knowledge of the importance of this factor in the marked changes in population trends which occurred in Europe and the United States during the 19th century.

The fact is that the relationship between land and population is, like any other biological question, a many-sided one. It demands close study by experts in many fields - statistics, public health, agriculture, sociology, psychology, and so on. This is not the place to discuss what is now known about the problem or how to go about solving it.⁺ We do, however, wish to emphasize the importance of continued study both within the government services and by private bodies. No attempt should be made to apply prematurely the results of such studies to practical situations, but the information and principles derived from them should be widely available.

There is, however, one practical step that might be made in the near future. In our opinion, it is quite in line with American tradition and would fit easily into the public health programs already in progress as part of Economic Cooperation

⁺Of the various studies available, that of the British Royal Commission on Populations is probably the most recent and comprehensive.

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Administration activity in backward areas. This step is the attempt to build up in these areas somewhat different attitudes toward individual life than now exists. Specifically, this change can be described in terms of encouraging mothers to recognize the value of having a limited number of healthy, energetic, and well-nourished children rather than a succession of sick, feeble, and starving ones. This can best come about as the result of public health activity which emphasizes maternal and child health. Much of the urge to produce unnaturally large numbers of children in certain parts of Asia now comes from a deeply felt need to ensure the survival of at least one son to help with cultivating the family plot, preserve the rites of ancestor worship, etc. Demonstration that medicine and public health provide a more certain means of survival may well reduce the exaggerated drive towards numbers. This opinion can at present be based on casual observations: The institution of modern public health services will provide excellent opportunities for quantitative observation. Such researches should be an integral part of any long-range program for raising the standard of life in the Far East. And they do not imply meddlesome or didactic interference with the customs or value systems of either our own or other countries.

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Annex 11

RESEARCH IN SUPPORT OF POLITICAL WARFARE

This Annex deals with the initiation and utilization of research in support of political warfare. It is divided into three sections. In the first part we concern ourselves directly with the ways in which research can best be utilized by governmental agencies responsible for waging political warfare. How may the consumer of research findings gain maximum benefit from studies done on his behalf. In the second section, we turn to a minimum list of research requirements which we believe to be basic to the support of political warfare generally. Finally, we append a series of research projects which, in the course of our discussions, have seemed to us of particular importance in guiding the kind of political warfare effort that has been described in our Report. Some of these research proposals are already the subject of investigation either in governmental agencies or at university centers.

Initiating and Utilizing Research

It is a matter of common experience that much research done on behalf of governmental agencies proves, upon completion, to be of little use in the guidance of policy or operations. Either the research was planned in such a way that the results are intrinsically useless in policy decision or research results do not find their way to the proper place in the decision structure of an agency at the proper time. Too often, moreover, research is utilized only after the fact of decision, serving as justification of actions already taken rather than as guidance. There are certain general principles or "cautions" which, we believe, can if followed reduce this unnecessary wastage of research effort.

1. Research coordination. Adequate research in support of governmental activity consists of the pretesting of alternative policies which are or will eventually be under consideration. Research which is well done is able to provide information about the possible consequences of various policies or actions. In the field of political warfare, research must be of such a kind that it provides partial predictions concerning the psychological repercussions at home and abroad of economic, military, diplomatic, and informational policies. Research, then, is a crucial arm of policy making at all levels of political warfare activity. But it is particularly crucial that research be instituted which will guide the central coordinating body charged with fashioning the overall national political warfare strategy. Without such a core of research effort, it is difficult indeed for any centralized executive to evaluate properly the uses to which the various components of political warfare can be put.

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Without an effective centralized political warfare executive, such coordinated research cannot be done.

2. Research and the forward planning of policy. From alternative policies under consideration by the policy maker grow the hypotheses to be tested by research. The social scientist, to be properly stimulated, should be asked to evaluate the consequences of alternative policies. He must hazard the best estimate possible as to which of a number of policies will best achieve a given political warfare objective. He may also be in a position of suggesting policies which may better achieve an objective than those presently under consideration. Indeed, given adequate communication between the policy maker and the research man, the latter may prove helpful by raising questions of a testable nature concerning the feasibility of certain broad policy objectives or by pointing to self-defeating consequences inherent in the pursuit of an objective.

But research takes time. Tomorrow's policy decision cannot be guided properly by research instituted today. It is only insofar as we can foresee the kinds of policy decisions that we shall be making weeks and months ahead that the tool of prudent research can be maximally useful. Unless policy contingencies are foreseen well in advance, an agency's research activity will be limited either to a rather general compilation of materials likely to be useful come what may, or to a frantic gathering of ad hoc data bearing on policy matters being discussed at the other end of a demanding telephone. Or, as is so often the case, a research staff is converted into an advisory staff with the function of providing estimates on the basis of accumulated knowledge rather than gathering new and direct knowledge on a problem.

3. Policy making and the research function. It follows from the above that in order for research to be of use to the policy maker, the policy maker must play a central role in the initiation of research. It is from his concerns about the future that research hypotheses are distilled. There must, then, be administrative recognition of the intimate linkage which necessarily exists between policy making and the research function. Insofar as the "desk man" and the research section are separated from each other, spiritually or administratively, the decisions of the desk will be based on riskier probabilities and the research of the social scientist rendered remote from the vital considerations of policy. It is frequently the case that, for reasons of security or because of other barriers to communication, those in charge of research receive little guidance in the formulation of their problems with a loss to all concerned.

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4. Intelligence, research, and policy. Just as the gathering of research data from open sources must be guided by considerations of future policy decisions, so must the gathering of intelligence be so guided if it is to serve in the evaluation of alternative policies. This is not to say that spot intelligence of certain specific types is not of great value, but merely to underline the fact that intelligence data must also be cumulative and gathered with a view to long range problems. The desk man normally briefs diplomatic personnel and/or agents concerning his requirements. It is our conviction that the research aide to the desk man should also participate in such briefings to assure that the kinds of intelligence data necessary for his work will be gathered in a form suitable for use in appraisal of future policies.

5. Security and communication. The problems of security in agencies which play a central role in the political warfare effort are serious. Without questioning the necessity of circumspect security measures, we must realize that one of the principal barriers to effective communication between policy and research personnel is the security barrier. It is frequently the case that forward planning policy discussions are not made known to relevant research teams, and, the reverse, that research findings are classified to a point where they cannot be made available to those executing policy decisions on which the research may have a bearing. The classification of the Report of Project TROY, to take but one example, makes it impossible to circulate the document as a whole in certain sections of the Department of State where it might conceivably serve a useful function. This is not to say that the classification is not warranted but merely to point up the problem of distribution. ~~Mindful~~ as we are of the problems of security involved in the present period of danger, we would do well to recognize that we are too often the victims of our own security regulations. The matter becomes the more serious when research is carried out beyond the confines of a government department, in a university setting. Here the danger is that the research activities of the non-government scientists be impoverished by an inability on the part of the policy makers to make known the nature of the policy problems they will be facing in the future. Tender as the subject may be, we feel that it is urgent that it come under the most careful scrutiny and review by high ranking policy and research officers in the Department.

6. Evaluation research. Thus far we have been speaking of research in advance of policy decision. There is an extension of policy research comprising follow-up studies on programs and policies already put into action. Such evaluation research provides a principal means of ~~gaining knowledge from our errors as from our successes.~~ But evaluation research presents an especially difficult problem in human relations. It is intrinsically difficult for an advocate of a program to serve at the same

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time as a judge of its effectiveness. It is often the case that research designed to evaluate a program is formulated in such a way that it serves primarily as a justification - whether the program has gone well or ill. Under these circumstances, evaluation research is scarcely illuminating. It is worth considering whether evaluation research should not be conducted by research teams free of the direct supervision of those in charge of executing the program being evaluated. Indeed, the more impartial the evaluation, the better since evaluation research can also be a means of sniping at a program.

7. Kinds of research. In addition to policy research and evaluation studies, there are other large areas of investigation that are not so closely linked to considerations of policy and action. So-called basic research is also needed to provide the necessary background for more studies oriented to policy. While one can predict only with the greatest difficulty which kinds of basic research will most illuminate future problems of policy, it is possible to a considerable degree to indicate areas of current scientific ignorance where basic research is needed. An example which comes readily to mind is ethnological research in Southeast Asia designed to throw light on the social structure of countries who will be receiving technical assistance under the Point Four program. We believe that careful planning of basic research requirements carried out jointly by policy makers, government research officers, and university scholars implemented by a flexible policy of contractual grants to university centers can be of immense help in assuring a backlog of vital basic research.

8. Where research is done. Some research projects are better suited to agencies within the Government proper; others might better be undertaken outside Washington on contract by private research organizations; and still others are in the category of long range research which can best be done within the conventional university setting. Considerations of personnel, "working atmosphere", and materials will dictate which setting is the best suited. It is our opinion that when it is feasible research in support of forward planning operations should be separated geographically from the pressures of an operating government agency both in the interest of utilizing personnel at universities and in order to assure an optimum research climate. Because of the critical shortage of competent research personnel it is desirable that as much research as possible be allocated by contract to private research centers and universities in order that a wide array of talent outside the Government may be brought to bear on the critical problems of political warfare. An added advantage to such decentralization of research is that specialists in the various phases of political warfare can be trained in their tasks by assisting at universities in political warfare research.

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9. Research on research utilization. Many of the points raised in the foregoing discussion are themselves subjects for research investigation: e.g., the best administrative relations between policy and research sections, the ways and means of reducing security barriers between various sections of an agency, the best techniques of distilling research hypotheses from the forward planning problems of the policy maker, and so on. The services of a sensitive social scientist who has worked on these problems might be enlisted to carry out studies of the best methods of initiating and utilizing research of various kinds within the Department of State. It goes without saying that, to be effective, such a research operation would require the support of the highest policy levels in the Department.*

10. Maintaining the balance between Universities and the Government. There is available for research on political warfare a highly limited supply of experts. The competition for their services is great. It is evident that the demand for political warfare specialists will continue to grow within the government. At the same time, much basic research on political warfare will have to be done outside of government at university centers. Moreover, if the present crisis is an extended one - as seems highly probable - there will be a problem of the advanced training of students in the constituent disciplines of political warfare. In short, it would be disastrous indeed to strip universities of large numbers of their key specialists at this time. It seems to us that several possible steps can be taken to maintain a balance between demands for political warfare specialized skills coming from government and from the universities.

a. Policy of rotation. A policy of rotating scholars, perhaps on a one-year cycle, between government work and university work.

b. Development of research institutes. The establishment of research institutes or projects at such university centers as the San Francisco Bay area, the New York area, and the Cambridge-Boston area. These institutes could carry out government research programs in the field of political warfare utilizing university personnel either on a part-time basis or by the use of a rotation plan which would permit university specialists to remain in their "home atmospheres" during leaves of absence from university duties.

c. Fellowship programs. In the training of graduate students as specialists in either foreign areas and/or disciplines related to political warfare, special training grants would be highly desirable. Various foundations have

*For an extended discussion of problems of research utilization, the reader is referred to R. K. Merton, "The Role of Applied Social Science in the Formation of Policy: A Research Memorandum," Philosophy of Science, 1949, 16, 161-161.

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already made funds available for the establishment of training centers and for student aid. Additional funds, perhaps in connection with the institutes mentioned above, would be helpful.

d. Rotation of government personnel. In order to maintain the closest working relationship between government and university specialists, it would be advisable to have government policy specialists assigned from time to time on a rotating basis to university research centers working on political warfare problems.

Basic Research Requirements

The conception of political warfare set forth in the main body of our Report requires certain continuing forms of research on target areas. While it is difficult to state specifically which kinds of research are most critically needed, it is possible to single out a few research topics which seem to us to be particularly urgent. Work on these topics is now going forward, of course, both in and out of the Government, but far more effort is required. Indeed, some of the necessary data for carrying out such research are already in existence at major centers of investigation such as the Harvard Russian Research Center, the Institute of International Studies at Yale, etc.

1. Study of the political control systems utilized for enforcing the decisions of groups holding or seeking power. In Russia, of course, such research would concentrate upon the coercive and persuasive operations of the Party, the MGB, and other controls systems. In Indo China, a quite different approach would be taken, emphasis being given perhaps to the special influence of local leaders representing Bao Dai and Ho. In Western Europe studies of the control system would be studies in the techniques of control by persuasion. In all cases, research must also analyze the vulnerabilities of political control systems - both those of our friends and those of our potential enemies. An important adjunct to such studies would be the careful psychological assessment of the authority relationship existing in various cultures. How are military, political, religious or other authority figures characteristically perceived and responded to?

2. Analysis of the social structure of key target areas. Studies of ethnic, class, and linguistic groupings within Russia and satellite areas should be extended to cover the major aspirations, dissatisfactions, and defectability of key groups. One illustration of this type of study is an extended investigation of nationality groupings along the border of Russia and China and the kinds of friction which may develop or be developed in these border areas - among the Turks, Kazaks, Mongolians, Chinese, etc.

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3. Analysis of basic attitudes of the target populations: their goals and dissatisfactions, their expectations and hopes. To guide our policy decisions and our information programs we need to know their conception of America, of the West in general, of the United Nations, and of the nature of the world conflict. We need to know the resistances and frictions resulting from political and social changes. Well-designed sample surveys can provide useful results in friendly countries; backward areas can best be approached with anthropological methods; for shielded areas we must depend on systematic interviews with persons who have recently defected.

4. Investigation of major channels of communication within a country and existing attitudes toward materials carried in these channels. Such studies should address themselves not only to formal media of communication, but to such informal means as rumor, grapevine, and the like. An ancillary feature of such studies should be the investigation of imposed blocks to communication and their effects: censorship, prohibitions on listening, etc. Emphasis must be placed on both the channels of communication and their content, the latter as a means of guiding information programs transmitted by us to the countries in question.

5. Continuing studies of domestic vulnerability to political warfare. In a special annex we note that the period ahead is a perilous one domestically, that we shall be converting ourselves into a garrison state in the hope that by being strong we can avoid a contest of arms. There are many serious problems that arise as a result of this inevitable transition from peacetime to prolonged preparedness. The special implications for research are detailed in Annex 13 to which the reader is referred.

6. Research on the changing of attitudes. The psychological processes involved in the changing of attitudes are deeply complex and only sketchily understood. Attitudes are imbedded in the adjustive functioning of the individual and their stability reflects in a vital sense the stabilizing forces in personality. What is critically needed at this time is basic research on the psychological factors in attitude formation and change - a task for the joint effort of psychologists, psychiatrists, and anthropologists.

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2. The Use of Radio

Three general types of investigations are here assumed to be fundamental and are mentioned briefly even at the risk of obviousness. The first of these is the continuing study of amount of listening and of listener reactions. Such studies should be of two kinds: conventional consumer studies; and more detailed, psychologically oriented studies on motivations for listening. The second series of problems relates to improving the content of programs. Improvement depends on the utilization of research of the kind outlined in the section dealing with basic research requirements and upon the ability to utilize current intelligence reports on the target areas. A third area of research has to do with the technical development of methods of better broadcasting and includes research and development in electronics, research on suitable transmitting sites, and policy-oriented research on the question of allocation of frequencies (see Annex 20). Finally, there is the more general problem of the utilization of radio in an integrated political warfare effort. Radio broadcasting is not an autonomous propaganda arm, but one which must be brought into close relation with other components of political warfare.

There remain, finally, a series of specific projects which are somewhat out of the usual run of research on radio.

a. Research and development on crystal receivers (see Annex 21) which can be produced cheaply [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This research must not only consider the technical problems involved in the production of such receivers and in their distribution but must also focus upon the likely psychological, social and political effects of distribution in a country such as Russia. (See Chapter 2.)

b. The study of the special problems of transmission to China and the countries of Southeast Asia. Here we may raise particularly the question of the various uses to which radio can be put in these areas; e.g., the use of radio as a means of internal communication in backward areas.

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c. A study of the feasibility of expanding broadcasting from the nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization beamed to the countries of Eastern Europe.

d. A study of the techniques for improving technical intelligence on Russian jammers, the Russian and satellite radio net, and on electronic development in the Russian orbit generally.

3. The Creation of the Image of America

The means whereby the image of America is built up abroad are rather limited. Our broadcasts, American movies, travelers and troops, translations of American novels and plays, and most crucially, the image created by the local press, radio, etc. - these comprise the range of contemporary media. In addition, there is the treatment of the United States in schoolbooks, in legend, and in anecdote. Our understanding of the processes which go into the creation of this image abroad is quite imperfect. Yet, it is a crucial factor in determining the way in which the peoples of other countries see our action and understand our policies.

Take, for example, the American movie. Many observers report that the American movies shown commercially in foreign countries are a most important factor in determining the basic picture of America. This contention has never been systematically tested, and we propose that research be undertaken to discover the impact of American movies and more specifically to determine the particular themes and elements which predispose to favorable or unfavorable attitudes in various countries. The objective of such research is not, of course, the development of "effective" censorship. But certainly the findings of such studies, made available to American motion picture exporters, would help the motion picture industry assess better for itself what pictures create unfortunate misconceptions abroad.

Perhaps of more immediate importance - particularly with the imminent prospect of several hundred thousand American troops in Europe - is the research question of how best prepare our troops for garrison duty abroad so that an undistorted image of America can be carried by them. While the techniques of indoctrination which will be used in preparing troops for European duty will be under the jurisdiction of the armed forces, the matter must be one of the greatest concern to the Department of State for the behavior of our troops in Western Europe can be crucial to the success of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other of our diplomatic and economic policies.

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6. Role of Russian Intellectuals

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The feasibility of increasing the flow of professional, artistic, and technical journals in a variety of fields between the United States on the one hand and Russia and her satellites on the other should be studied. A beginning has been made in the State Department study, "Science and Foreign Relations" (1950). The flow of mail to the satellite countries is still relatively open and in the case of Russia there is still opportunity to increase the input of journals. This provides one way of reaching the intelligentsia in these countries and should be given close scrutiny for its possible effectiveness. Ways and means should also be studied for increasing the number of invitations to Russian and satellite scientists, artists, and professional men to attend learned conferences held either in Europe or the United States. Research is needed to determine whether such activity serves to maintain the feeling in the satellite countries that intellectuals have not been abandoned by the West and in Russia that the government is blocking scientifically useful contacts with Western colleagues.

7. The Concept of "United Europe"

If unity of Europe has any effectiveness as a program for promoting cooperation among the Western countries and as an appeal to the Eastern countries, it will be necessary to learn a great deal about the unifying and divisive forces affecting European cooperative effort. Such studies have traditionally been carried on at the level of political and economic analysis. Studies of factors in public opinion dividing and/or uniting the countries of Western Europe are vitally needed. There now exist in virtually all the countries of Western Europe highly competent public opinion research organizations, quite capable of mounting a cooperative study of this kind under

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central direction. It might indeed be possible to use Economic Cooperation Administration counterpart funds to finance such a research endeavor. The meaning of various nationalisms, of the symbol "Europe", of the significance of Marshall plan aid and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and various other items could be brought under careful empirical scrutiny. Such a venture would not only serve to provide needed information but might have a healthy morale effect in bringing to the surface many sources of friction which have remained hidden.

Similar study is also necessary of the major sources of feelings of deprivation in being cut off from Europe in various groups and classes of such key satellites as Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and occupied Germany and Austria - all of which had considerable working contact with the West before the imposition of communist control. What acts and statements tend to increase identification with Western Europe in these countries and what factors alienate them from Western Europe? Special studies should be made of the new and the old intelligentsia of the satellite states to determine whether the alienation of the new group from the West is so complete as to leave us with the alternative of appealing primarily to the remnants of the older Western oriental groups.

8. Technical and Economic Assistance to Underdeveloped Countries

A careful review of research possibilities which would aid us in increasing the psychological impact of the economic and technical programs. Anthropological study of resistances to technological change in the backward areas of Southeast Asia, shortly to benefit from Point Four program on a larger scale, should help to show how these resistances can be overcome. Greater acceptance can be expected also if we learn how to increase the feeling of participation of local populations in technical assistance programs, whether they be of the public health type or more specifically economic in character.

A study of technological improvements and inventions could be made with particular reference to their applicability to the backward economies of Southeast Asia. Our assumption that the introduction of tractors into an economy is necessarily a good thing may lead us astray. What is needed is a technical institute which will devote itself to the problem of inventing the things for Southeast Asian requirements, e.g., a good hoe may be more useful at the present time than tractors.

9. Effectiveness of Exchange of Persons

At the present time the State Department is cooperating with other

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agencies in a large-scale program involving exchange of persons with many foreign countries. Very little is known about the effectiveness of such visits in achieving the objectives for which the program was established. Certain preliminary evidence tends to show that Indians and Germans brought to this country do not leave with any more favorable attitudes than they brought, although the evidence is ambiguous. Research is needed on the evaluation of the program, on methods of selecting persons for exchange, on methods of briefing such persons, and on the length and type of experience that will be most effective. Follow-up study will be necessary after the exchange has returned to his home country, in order to evaluate the permanence of the effect of his experience and the influence he exerts on others.

10. Research on Political Warfare Administration

An integrated political warfare effort using the various components of such warfare in concert is an immensely complex undertaking from an administrative and training point of view. It is our feeling that creative research on techniques of organizing and operating political warfare problems is essential. Some of the specific problems of organization that were raised in the introductory section of this Annex. There are, to be sure, many others involved in the selection and training of political warfare operators, in the organization of interdepartmental coordination, and so on. On the side of intelligence gathering, for example, there are many serious questions as to how best to use our library facilities from the open shelves of which come some 80 to 90 per cent of our government intelligence. Much material in the Library of Congress is not being exploited. For example, there is no research center or institute now utilizing the rather considerable holdings of the Library on Africa. We believe that it would be worth while to look into the question of establishing a foreign area research center at the Library of Congress made up of institutes each specializing on different parts of the world. There are bound to be continuing problems attending the establishment of an active political warfare effort. Earlier we suggested that a highly expert group be brought into active service to carry out continuing studies of the problems of administration. We believe that without such a group, the dangers of deep confusion and waste are very great.

Jerome Bruner
Francis L. Friedman
Donald G. Marquis
Robert S. Morison
Robert Wolff

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Annex 13

FORWARD PLANNING

The rather obvious point is made in Chapter 8 that the attitudes and values of our citizens exert a critical influence on the formation of our foreign policy. In the years immediately ahead, the traditional attitudes of the American people may be modified by the unusual pressures placed upon them at home and from abroad. These modifications may, in turn, force profound and unwanted alterations in the conduct of our foreign policy. It seems the part of wisdom, therefore, to try to foresee the nature of these pressures and to discover means to thwart such untoward influences as they may exert upon our life.

For the first time in its history the United States is confronted with the necessity of remaining indefinitely mobilized and poised for a conflict that may come tomorrow and that may never come at all. The Assistant Secretary of Defense suggests that this condition may continue for ten years and warns that we must not "peter out along the way".

Why, one may ask, might we peter out? There is first the question how, indeed, whether, this country can reconcile itself to persistent ambiguity. There is the question also, how, indeed, whether, the traditional values that have flourished in a free environment can be preserved in what may become the cage of a garrison state.

The ambiguity already is clear enough - from the boy who must convince himself that duty in Korea is a logical continuation of his study in school or college, to the whole nation which must acquiesce in the fact that business as usual means running an arsenal. Further, the incongruities of this existence must be dealt with by a people who can find in their past few precedents to draw upon in seeking wise courses through this kind of troubled present. Americans, historically, have been able, by chance and by their own efforts, to obtain reasonably complete and immediate satisfactions for their desires. Today they find that most gratifications must be postponed for a season, and even that some part of desire itself must be denied. In the past, there was a world we could enter at times with good fellowship and from which we could withdraw at other times to avoid the cool indifference or sporadic irritation of our neighbors. Now we must live - and live indefinitely - within a world of suspicion and hostility, a world in which there are people who really do not like us and from which there can be no withdrawing. Finally, the old and easy assurance of men who believed the future belonged to them has been displaced by a foreboding doubt that anybody's future can withstand the atom bomb.

How can this country - or any country - in this position and with this past accommodate itself to extended incongruity and danger? A nation, to elude such tension may, like France in the 30's withdraw into torpor, or, like Germany at the end of that decade, seek release in the act of violence. In either case, the temper

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of the people binds the hands of those who seek to develop a wise and conserving foreign policy. The object of such a policy at present cannot be the reduction of strain through torpor - which is surrender, or through violence - which is war, but the indefinite continuation of an uncertain and ambiguous time which alone, unhappily, is our hope of safety. We have to learn to live in such a time.

The second question is perhaps part of the first: how can the values developed in the relative freedom of peace be preserved in a nation armed and ready for war? Those historic values have not yet been severely modified, nor are we yet a garrison state. But already many of the conditions of the state are with us in varying degrees of intensity - the standing army, the heavy taxes to support the army, the control of prices and wages, the allocation of critical materials, the security regulations and investigations. There is already far less play in the system than there was twenty years ago.

The machinery to order and direct our energies is now necessary. But its authority to control large sections of the environment presents at least a threat to some of the historic qualities that we have heretofore assumed to be an inherent part of our way of life.

There is the quality of diversity - the acceptance of racial, political, regional, social and religious difference. It has been our capacity to accept these variations that has given us not only much of our distinction but much of our strength as well. In what way may this diversity maintain itself against the uniformities necessarily imposed by military training for all youth, by a steeply rising tax structure, by the mobilized distrust of a potential enemy, by the relative similarity of occupation required by service, in any form, to the state?

There is the quality of mobility - from region to region, job to job, class to class. By all the requirements of this occasion - military service, economic control, manpower regulations - the mobility of the individual is directly assailed.

There is the quality of curiosity that has marked with a common boldness the dissimilar explorations of such Americans as Daniel Boone, Willard Gibbs, W. A. Roebling, and John Marin. The single purpose of the garrison state tends, naturally, to absorb the attention of all intelligences - whether in industry, government, or university. This concentration on a single problem or set of problems will tend to reduce not only the variety of intellectual work, but will tend also to reduce, for two reasons, even the American bump of curiosity. First, the inevitable requirements of immediate usefulness and direct application of ideas tend in time to suggest that all speculation may be idle. Second, one of the prime deterrents to creative thinking, which must begin in curiosity, is, so experiment suggests, inhibition. Concentration on a single, arbitrarily presented problem creates in itself a kind of inhibition by closing the mind to considerations whose relevancy may not be obviously and immediately apparent.

There is the quality of affection or sympathy which, like all feeling, may have been unevenly expressed in our history, but which has nevertheless always

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been at work. There are several elements in the garrison state that are in conflict with it. There is the fact that war - whether hot or cold - with its imperatives of unquestioning obedience to your own and suspicion and hate of the other collides with the aims of sympathy. There is the fact that a man is deprived of the initiative in many of the most personal parts of his life - what the temperature of his room shall be, what kind of meat he shall buy, how far into the country he shall drive. The controls in these areas, set up as they are by a remote and unseen authority that reveals itself for the most part on bits of paper, reduce the sphere of personal decision and thus increase the loss of a feeling for personality on which the feeling of sympathy depends. Military discipline, relying on the necessarily arbitrary command relationship which cannot take fully into account individual requirements, increases the tendency toward depersonalization. There is the fact that the absence from home of fathers in government service and of mothers in defense jobs tends to break down the family solidarity which is the seal of affection. The Tavistock Clinic in England has documented the aimless - and worse - behavior of children deprived of a sympathetic home life by the necessities of war.

There is another element in the American environment upon which all of these four enumerated qualities depend, indeed, upon which the American system as we have known it may be said to rest: the element of free communication. This free communication may be placed in jeopardy by the conditions of the garrison state. There is the curious restraint of censorship. There is the reduction of two-way communication, imposed by the transmission of orders and directives from authority to subordinate. There is the unconscious restraint of mounting suspicion and prejudice. And today we have with us the classified idea. In the long run this may prove more dangerous to free communication than any other single thing. At the moment, to be sure, the influence of the classified idea has not been much felt; it has been extended only with great caution and, almost exclusively, to the few universities that have secret projects for the government. There is pause in the thought, however, that universities are, in this society, one of the great wellsprings of ideas and that the source of supply for these springs is the unobstructed flow of information and ideas.

The problems presented in this Annex can all be summed up in one general query: how can the values created by our relatively free society in a past that was, for the most part serene, be perpetuated within a relatively controlled society during an ominous present? or how, more simply, in the words of the Under Secretary of State, can we maintain democracy in a garrison? Since this is an unprecedented time for us we can look for few specific answers to this question out of our own experience.

There are however some comforting indications from the past and from the present. France for instance in the years between 1870 and 1914 maintained itself and most of the things that made it France in a long period of doubt and danger. And, recently, men in the social sciences have made real advances, through the experimental method, in our understanding both of group communication and of group responses to ambiguous situations. From the past we may learn that it has been done, and from the present we may discover how we may do it.

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We earnestly recommend a research program that will pool the energy and wisdom of historians, anthropologists, economists and psychologists to analyze the possible effects of a prolonged preparedness upon this society and to provide us with a basis for dealing intelligently with the life that lies immediately before us.

There is further indication that we, with adequate information, can deal with the problems of the garrison state in all its ugly implications. In time past, our national integrity has been threatened both from abroad by hostile armies and from within by such things as the institution of slavery, the exaggerations of private monopoly, the dead weight of unemployment and depression. On these occasions we have demonstrated a capacity to inform ourselves about the real situation. We have listened to Webster and Hayne, subscribed to the Liberator, read the muckrakers, studied the majority and dissenting opinions, and followed the great debate on Lend-Lease. By our historic processes of public debate, private conversation, and the printed word we have achieved awareness of the real conditions of the times. Responsible governments have assisted here - in a first inaugural, in a farewell address, in a Lusitania note, or at Gettysburg. No doubt, in the process there has been lost motion, pain, and embarrassment for quicker minds, but by it we have gotten to the bottom of the larger dangers that have confronted us, and by it we have maintained our insight into ourselves and our environment, which is the basis for all understanding.

There is justification therefore for the optimism that suggests we ought also to get to the bottom of the garrison state. There should be a program of public education in which officials and citizens both actively participate. This program should include a careful examination by trained intelligences of all the data produced by past history and current experiment that will throw light on our situation. It should include a presentation of the facts of our life by officials, and the constant discussion in the press and on the radio by men in government and by private citizens. If, by these historic methods, we succeed in describing and understanding the nature of the threat turned against us by the garrison state in time of prolonged danger, there is no reason to believe we shall not act as we have before, with resilience, imagination, trust and resolution to hold on to the qualities we set store by.

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Annex 14

PUBLIC OPINION

The foreign policy of democratic governments must grow out of the convictions of the people. Traditionally in America, the detailed conduct of foreign affairs has not been a major concern of the people, who have been content to leave such matters to the government. Recent surveys show that most of the people do not know the relevant facts on which policy must be based, nor are they interested in learning. They do have a deep emotional concern with the prospect of war, of draft for military service, and of economic controls and higher taxes. In this sense the citizen is finding that our international policy is of serious concern to him.

There has been remarkable achievement during the past few years in securing public support for increased international commitment, such as economic assistance to European countries. But the test lies ahead when the impact of our mobilization program is really felt. Apathetic acquiescence in the foreign policy of our government will not be sufficient; the new situation calls for sufficient identification with national goals that everyone will undertake his share in the consequences of economic and military mobilization. The total program will succeed only if the morale of the people is sufficiently high to support the burdens it imposes.

Public understanding of our international policy will probably be a critical factor in maintaining internal morale. High productivity and personal sacrifice are secured when our country is clearly engaged in defending itself against attack. It is not so certain that morale can be maintained over a long period of waiting, especially if our goals and prospects are not seen clearly by all.

A special problem of public support might arise if Russia were to appear to relax or stabilize her aggressive pressure. The Soviet threat is a major factor in present support of policies such as military assistance to Europe. Surveys in 1950 indicated that the supporters of this policy perceived the Soviet threat as greater than did the non-supporters. They tended more to expect war, they more often saw Russia as powerful, and they admitted our dependence on allies twice as often as did non-supporters.

Other problems of public support may well arise if the government adopts a policy of aggressive political warfare. Certain actions, desirable for overall reasons, might elicit serious opposition unless they were understood clearly as part of an overall program. Possible examples are the admission of Red China to the United Nations, the opening of trade channels to Communist countries, the further abandonment of Chiang Kai-shek, or the acceptance in the Western European army of troops from satellite countries.

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These few examples merely illustrate the type of problems which can be anticipated. We may now consider the role of public attitudes in the conduct of foreign affairs.

How Does Public Opinion Influence Foreign Policy?

A major faith of the democratic state is that the people are inherently wise and just, and that they are the real rulers. These propositions have real meaning, but they do not have to be interpreted as direct and literal control of public policy by public opinion. The issues and strategies of specific foreign policy are too complex and remote for the people in the mass to grasp with justice and wisdom. The function of the public in a democratic policy-making process is to set certain basic directions and criteria in the form of widely held values and fundamental goals, and to accept or resist particular actions in terms of their conformity to these values and goals.

At the same time, the specific work of policy formulation is carried on by responsible government officials with more or less close participation by a small number of opinion leaders from all segments of our society. This group of leaders, relatively better educated and better informed, occupy positions of responsibility in government, industry, labor, radio, press, etc., and include the large number of community, vocational, and institutional persons who are known and trusted by their following -- clergymen, teachers, club leaders, etc. Their voices are heard both in Washington and in Middletown. More should be known about the role of such opinion leaders in the process of mediating between foreign policy and public opinion.

In this framework it becomes clear that there is no point in submitting specific issues of foreign policy to referendum by public opinion polls. Opinion on particular topical issues will be crystallized only after public debate and discussion. Surveys have shown marked shifts in specific opinions over short periods. In general the support of a policy increases after it is announced and put into effect; e.g., the loan to Britain, the military commitment in Korea. Policy formulators must, however, take into account the basic values and attitudes of the people, and in effect must predict the eventual public support of any proposed action. This prediction is sometimes done with uncanny accuracy. For example in the months of 1940-41 while the government was undertaking a progressive series of steps committing it to support of the Allies, surveys of public opinion showed that the number of people who thought that Roosevelt was moving neither too fast nor too slow remained a constant majority within 3 or 4 percentage points.

Because most of the discussion of foreign policy takes place in a small minority of opinion leaders, there is increased opportunity for any special interest group to exert undue influence. Such pressures have been effective in matters of tariff and trade and in religious issues. While there is some recognition that interest advocacy cannot be pressed with the same freedom in foreign policy matters as in domestic, there is further need for acceptance of

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broad national interests by special groups, and for resistance to their pressure for narrow gains. In some cases it may also be important to determine whether the spokesmen accurately represent the attitudes of their constituency. For example, at a time recently when nine-tenths of the lobbies were opposing a universal military training bill the Gallup poll disclosed that 60 per cent of the people favored the measure. And it might turn out that in the question of aid to Spain, the members of the Catholic group would put opposition to dictatorship above religious affiliation although their spokesmen do not.

How Can Policy be Best Presented to Earn Support?

The broad consensus of public opinion can also be taken into account in formulating the best public presentation of our foreign policy. Very often there are several alternative ways to explain an action, and the choice among them will determine the degree of popular support which will be achieved. This kind of problem is fully recognized in the advertising profession, but its dimensions are entirely different in questions of public policy, and it calls for a thorough understanding and analysis of the basic goals and attitudes of the American people.

The most effective public presentation of a policy is not necessarily identical with the best justification for the policy in the mind of the policy-maker. For purposes of long range public education it is desirable to inform the people of the true justification of the policy, but this can often be supplemented by reasons that touch the personal lives and convictions of the citizens. For example, the adoption of the policy on economic aid to Europe may have been primarily to build a bulwark against Soviet expansion, but surveys show that the people supported it, at least in the early phases, for idealistic and moral reasons of "helping out." And it is likely that any policy of negotiation with China or Russia would be doomed if it were presented as "appeasement", but might secure support if it could be seen as "horse-trading."

How Can Public Understanding and Support be Increased?

The State Department has a special responsibility for informing the public on the background and the issues in foreign affairs. In this effort all appropriate channels of dissemination should be utilized, but primary emphasis should be directed toward the opinion leaders whose role was outlined above. They are the ones who can best understand the complex issues and the broad framework of policy decisions. It is through their activities that the mass of the people can best be reached. The State Department has a well organized program of public information and the following suggestions are offered as strengthening and supplementing the present effort.

1. It is generally recognized that a broad consensus of public support can only be built on a basis of accurate and full information. Much information on current conditions is collected by the State Department. We cannot expect opinion leaders to accept and support the policy unless the critical information is also available to them. Certain reports which are security restricted in order to

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protect sources or to prevent unjustified criticism might be released through other than official government channels. In general it is found that persons with better informational backgrounds are more favorable to government foreign policy than the less well informed. This is to be expected if we assume that policy is formulated on the basis of the best information.

2. It is well established by research in social psychology that persons will tend more to agree with a decision and to cooperate in carrying it out if they (or their representatives) have participated in the formulation of the decision. This finding suggests the potential value of increasing the number of State Department conferences with groups of opinion leaders. Such meetings will be most effective if the participants feel that they have had an opportunity to express their views.

3. Since the level of education and information is inadequate in most people for evaluation of specific foreign policy acts, their attitudes are influenced mostly by the statements of persons in whom they have general trust. In this connection there is obvious value to be gained by increasing the general confidence in the President, the Secretary of State, and the Department of State. Study of the reasons for the current lack of confidence should suggest possible ways to increase confidence. One possible procedure would be the selection of a board of outstanding national leaders to work occasionally with the Secretary in the formulation of long range policy. The individuals should be selected on the basis of their national stature as well as their special competence. The board could issue statements directly to the public, and could also as individuals meet with other groups of opinion leaders. The patterns of the Committee for Economic Development and of the Harriman Committee are obvious models for careful consideration.

America's Image of Itself

Much of the effectiveness of national policy in the present polarized international situation depends on the picture of America which is held by the rest of the world. Although radio script writers may construct attractive pictures for broadcasting, the perception by others will largely be determined by the acts of our government and of our citizens, especially as they come in contact with people of other countries. No picture of America will be believed except as it is widely held by the troops, the travelers, and the officials abroad, and by the people of America generally. If Americans are confused and discouraged they cannot be made to appear strong and confident to the peoples of the world.

Any steps which help Americans to clarify and to reach greater agreement on their understanding of "the American way of life" will contribute to this objective.

The American people in general have not yet fully accepted the fact that our nation has a real responsibility in the world community. They have not

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reached "political maturity," and as a result they often call for actions without full consideration of the repercussions in our global responsibility. For example, as Cordell Hull once pointed out, many people believe that we can change our foreign policy as we would change a necktie.

One point of particular importance at the present time concerns our ideas of "capitalistic free-enterprise." The experience of many foreign peoples with capitalism makes them think of it as a ruthless, exploiting system of private cartels which contributes nothing to the general welfare of the workers. Communist propaganda has therefore been especially effective in arousing strong desires for their socialistic alternative. So long as the American system is seen as "capitalistic" it will not appear very attractive. The modifications imposed by federal regulation of trusts, by corporate taxes and graduated income taxes, and by strong labor unions, are not a part of the foreign picture of American capitalism partly because they are not generally understood and admitted within America. Other examples can readily be found, such as the interpretation of democratic disagreement and debate as confusion and disunity.

Public education in the direction of increased self-understanding and maturity is a task in which the resources of the universities and of private foundations and organizations might be mobilized. The methods can be worked out only with widespread cooperation and ingenuity. For example, it is known from psychological research that a person's self-perception is greatly influenced and clarified by awareness of what others think about him. This suggests that it would be valuable to secure and disseminate more information on what people in other countries think and believe about America. (A book on this theme by John Hersey could be very useful.)

Research

All the suggestions contained in this report call for an improved and continuing analysis of the attitudes and basic motivations of the American people. Suggestions for research on this problem are contained in Annex 11.

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Annex 15

STALIN

Since Stalin's death offers the best opportunity for exploiting the fear and self-interest of the Soviet elite with the aim of weakening the regime to the point where it can no longer threaten our world objectives, and since the death of the dictator can occur at any time, it is of the utmost importance to initiate planning for this eventuality without delay.

At the first step it is proposed that a special section be set up within the Political Warfare Executive to concentrate exclusively on this task. This staff should include the following competencies:

- a. Detailed and intimate knowledge of Russian history, especially of the Time of Troubles at the end of the 16th century and the beginning of the 17th, and the period of Soviet history from the death of Lenin to the Moscow trials of 1937 and 1938. This expertise presumably would be provided by an historian.
- b. Comprehensive and detailed knowledge of the Governmental and Party structure of the U.S.S.R. and its functioning. A political scientist who has specialized on the U.S.S.R., or a Foreign Service officer with long residence in Moscow, should meet this requirement.
- c. Understanding of the social psychology of the Soviet elite and peoples. A person with the training and experience of Henry Dicks would be needed.
- d. Knowledge of the structure and operation of the Soviet economy.
- e. Familiarity with methods and techniques of all types of Political Warfare -- black, grey, and white.
The full time staff of this section should call in as consultants other specialists, both from within and from outside of the Government.

The first task of the section should be to collect the views of the most competent students of Soviet government and society and those of recent refugees from the U.S.S.R. as to what is likely to take place when Stalin dies. From these views, several hypotheses should be developed. For example, one hypothesis might well be that a triumvirate consisting of Molotov, Beria and Malenkov would inherit Stalin's power. Another hypothesis might assume that Beria, Bulganin and Molotov would form the triumvirate. Another might be that Bulganin, backed by the armed forces would attempt to seize control. Still another might be that Beria, with the backing of the MGB and MVD would seize power, etc.

For each one of these hypotheses, the general outline of a political warfare campaign would be developed. Each would be designed to exploit the particular situation assumed in the hypothesis to create a maximum of confusion. Ideally, the planning based on each hypothesis should be continuous, with a team assigned

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John A. Morrison

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ANNEX SIXTEEN

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Annex 16

BIOGRAPHY OF TEAM

The members of the group that took part in Project TROY are listed below, together with brief biographical statements of each person.

1. Bailey, Dana K.

b. Clarendon Hill, Ill., November 22, 1916; U. of Arizona BS (Astronomy) 1937; Oxford U. Rhodes Scholar BA (Physics) 1940, MA 1943; U.S. Army Signal Corps 1941-46; Air Ministry representative at Interservices Ionosphere Bureau in England 1941-43; charge Radio Propagation Section, Office of Chief Signal Officer, Washington, D.C., 1943-45, Manila 1945, Tokyo 1945-46; project engineer in charge Communications Section, Project RAND, Douglas Aircraft, Santa Monica 1946-48; advisor on U.S. delegation to Provisional Frequency Board of the International Telecommunications Union, Geneva, Switzerland, representing National Bureau of Standards 1948-50; assistant to Chief, Division 14, National Bureau of Standards since 1950.

2. Bavelas, Alex

b. Chicopee, Mass., December 25, 1915; Springfield College BS 1940; State U. of Iowa MA 1944; M.I.T. Ph.D 1946; res. assoc. M.I.T. 1944-46; instructor M.I.T. 1946-48; asst. prof. M.I.T. 1948-49; assoc. prof. M.I.T. 1949; consultant. Dewey and Almy Chemical Co. 1944-48; Towle Mfg. Co. 1948-50.

3. Berkner, Lloyd V.

b. Milwaukee, Wis., February 1, 1905; U. of Minnesota BS (EE) 1927; George Washington U. studies physics 1933-35; engineer Airways Division, U.S. Department of Commerce 1927-28; engineer Byrd Antarctic Expedition 1928-30; research engineer National Bureau of Standards 1930-33; research physicist Department of Terrestrial Magnetism, Carnegie Institution of Washington 1933-41; head Electronics Materials Branch, U.S. Navy Bureau of Aeronautics 1941-46; executive secretary Research and Development Board, National Military Establishment 1946-47; chairman Section on Exploration of Geophysics of Atmosphere, Department of Terrestrial Magnetism 1947-48; special assistant to Secretary of State to direct work related to the Military Assistance Program 1949; captain U.S. Naval Reserve.

4. Bruner, Jerome S.

b. New York, N.Y., October 1, 1915; Duke U. BA 1937; Harvard U. Ph.D 1941; research analyst Princeton Listening Center, Summer 1940; special analyst Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service 1941-42; social science analyst, Div. of Prog. Surveys, U.S. Dept. Agriculture 1942-43; res. assoc. School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton 1943-44; field representative Overseas Branch, O.W.I. 1944-45; lecturer on psychology, Harvard U. 1945-48; assoc. prof. social psychology, Harvard U. since 1948; member editorial board Public Opinion Quarterly.

5. Burchard, John Ely

b. Marshall, Minn., December 8, 1898; U. of Minnesota 1915-18; M.I.T. SB 1923, MS 1925; Bemis Industries Inc., Boston, and affiliated company, Housing Co., 1925-38, vice pres. 1933-38; prof. and director Albert Farwell Bemis Foundation, M.I.T. 1938-48; Director of Libraries, M.I.T. 1944-48; Dean of Humanities and Social Studies M.I.T. since 1948; exec. officer Committee on Passive Protection against Bombing, National Research Council 1940-43; exec. officer Commission on Fortification Design, National Research Council 1943-44; chairman Section B, Division A, National Defense Research Committee 1940-42, chief Division 2, 1943-44; asst. chief Office of Field Service, Office of Scientific Research and Development, 1944-45, deputy chief 1945; received Presidential Medal for Merit June 1948.

6. Deutsch, Martin

b. Vienna, Austria, January 29, 1917; naturalized, Boston, February 3, 1941; M.I.T. BS 1937, Ph. D (Physics) 1941; instructor M.I.T. 1941-44; asst. prof. 1945-49; assoc. prof. since 1949; staff member Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, 1944-46.

7. Friedman, Francis L.

b. New York, N.Y., September 5, 1918; Harvard U. AB 1939, MA 1940; M.I.T. Ph. D (Physics) 1949; grad. asst. U. of Wisconsin 1941; asst. physicist National Bureau of Standards 1941-42; physicist Plutonium Project, U. of Chicago 1942-46; research assoc. M.I.T. 1946-49; Arthur D. Little post doctoral fellow 1949-50; asst. prof. M.I.T. 1950; Assoc. and Director Nuclear Development Associates, New York.

8. Hill, A. G.

b. St. Louis, Mo., January 11, 1910; Washington U. BS 1930, MS 1934; U. of Rochester Ph. D (Physics) 1937; instructor M.I.T. 1937-41; physicist Research Corp. 1941; staff member M.I.T. Radiation Laboratory 1942-46; prof. M.I.T. since 1946; consultant Federal Telecommunications Laboratories since 1945; Research and Development Board 1947; Brookhaven National Laboratory 1947; Director, Research Laboratory of Electronics, M.I.T.

9. Kelly, Burnham

b. Evanston, Ill., January 23, 1912; Williams College AB 1933; Harvard College LLB 1936; M.I.T. MCP 1941; law clerk, Providence, R.I., 1936-38; planning engineer Mass. Commission on Public Safety 1941; asst. exec. officer Committee on Fortification Design, National Research Council 1941-44; various titles from technical aide to special asst. to div. chief, National Defense Research Committee, 1942-44; field service consultant to Office of Scientific Research and Development 1944-45; res. asst. M.I.T. 1940-41, assoc. 1945-46, asst. prof. 1946-50, assoc. prof. since 1950; Albert Farwell Bemis Foundation, M.I.T., asst. director, 1945-48, director since 1948.

10. Kluckhohn, Clyde

b. Le Mars, Iowa, January 11, 1905; Princeton 1922; U. of Wisconsin AB 1928; U. of Vienna 1931-32; Oxford U. (Rhodes Scholar) MA 1932; Harvard U. Ph. D 1936; asst. prof. anthropology U. of Mexico and res. assoc. archeology, Sch. of American Research 1932-34; instructor in anthropology Harvard U. 1935-37, asst. prof. 1937-40, assoc. prof. 1940-46, prof. since 1946; director Russian Research Center, Harvard U. since 1947; consultant at Gen. Douglas MacArthur Hdqtrs. 1946-47; staff member School for Overseas Administration, Harvard U. 1943-44; deputy chief Joint Morale Survey, War Dept. and O.W.I. 1944-45; consultant to U.S. Indian Service since 1942; director Institute of Ethnic Affairs; editor, Growth.

11. Marquis, Donald G.

b. Two Harbors, Minn., June 22, 1908; Teachers College, Bellingham, Wash., 1924-25; Stanford U. AB 1928; Yale U. Ph. D (Psychology) 1932; fellow National Research Council 1932-33; teacher Yale U. 1933-35, 1936-45; fellow Rockefeller Foundation 1935-36; director Office of Psychological Personnel, National Research Council 1934-45; technical aide, Army-Navy Vision Committee, Office of Scientific Research and Development, Washington, 1944-45; prof. U. of Michigan since 1945.

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12. Millikan, Max F.

b. Chicago, Ill., December 12, 1913; Calif. Inst. of Technology 1931-33; Yale U. BS 1935; Cambridge U. 1935-36; Yale U. Ph. D (Economics) 1941; instructor Yale U. 1938-41; asst. prof. Yale U. 1941-42; business specialist, Office of Price Administration 1942; economist, War Shipping Administration 1944-46; chief, Economic Intelligence Branch, Division of Research for Europe, Department of State, 1946; asst. exec. secy. President's Committee on Foreign Aid 1947; consultant House Sel. Committee on Foreign Aid 1947; research assoc. Yale U. 1946-49; assoc. prof. M.I.T. 1949; consultant, Economic Cooperation Administration 1948-50; Dept. of the Air Force 1949-50; lecturer National War College, 1948-50; consultant, Gordon Gray, Exec. Office of the President, Washington, D.C., 1950.

13. Morison, Elting E.

b. Milwaukee, Wis., December 14, 1909; Harvard U. AB 1932, AM 1937; teacher Wooster School, Danbury, Conn., 1932-33; St. Mark's School, Southboro, Mass. 1934-35; asst. dean, Harvard College 1935-37; Staff Commander of the Eastern Sea Frontier 1942-43; director, Historical Section, Office of Chief of Naval Operations 1944-46; consultant Research Development Board, Houghton Mifflin Co. 1946; editor, Letters of Theodore Roosevelt since 1946; assoc. prof. M.I.T. since 1946.

14. Morison, Robert S.

b. Milwaukee, Wis., November 25, 1906; Harvard U. AB 1930; Harvard Medical School MD 1935; resident physician Collis P. Huntington Memorial Hospital 1934-35; Austin teaching fellow Harvard Medical School 1935-36; instructor in physiology Harvard Medical School 1936-38; assoc. in anatomy Harvard Medical School 1938-1941, asst. prof. of anatomy 1941-44; Asst. Director Medical Sciences Rockefeller Foundation 1944-48, assoc. director Medical Sciences since 1949.

15. Morrison, John A.

b. Portsmouth, N.H., October 8, 1903; U. of Chicago SB 1925, SM 1927, Ph. D (Geography) 1938; U. of Breslau 1927-28; instructor in geography U. of Chicago 1928-38; lecturer on U.S.S.R., Institute of International Understanding 1938-40; deputy chief U.S.S.R. Division Research and Analysis Branch, Office of Strategic Services, 1941-45; chief Eastern Europe Branch, Division of Research for Europe, Department of State 1945-47; consultant Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, 1948; director of studies National War College, 1947-48; prof. and head of Department of Geography, U. of Maryland since 1949.

16. Pierce, John R.

b. Des Moines, Iowa, March 27, 1910; Calif. Inst. of Tech. Ph. D 1936; member of technical staff, Bell Telephone Laboratories Inc. since 1936.

17. Purcell, Edward M.

b. Taylorville, Ill., August 30, 1912; Purdue U. BS (EE) 1933; Tech. Hochschule, Karlsruhe, Germany, 1933-34; Harvard U. Ph. D (Physics) 1938; instructor in physics, Harvard U. 1938-40; staff member, Radiation Laboratory, M.I.T. 1940-46; assoc. prof. physics, Harvard U. 1946-49, prof. of physics since 1949.

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18. Salisbury, W. W.

b. Carthage, Ill., December 27, 1903; U. of Iowa BA 1926; U. of Calif. 1937-38; Cornell College Sc. D 1940; res. asst. U. of Iowa 1926-27; teaching fellow U. of Calif. 1937-38; sound engineer General Dramatone Corp. 1927; Hollywood Film Enterprises 1929; consulting engineer 1930-35; employment analyst U.S. Department of Labor 1935-37; res. assoc. U. of Calif. Radiation Lab. 1937-41; staff member M.I.T. Radiation Lab. 1941-42; division head, Harvard Radio Research Lab. 1942-45; Director of Research, Collins Radio Co. since 1945.

19. Speier, Hans

b. Berlin, Germany, February 3, 1905; universities of Berlin and Heidelberg; Ph. D Heidelberg 1928; social science editor, Ullstein Publishing House 1928-31; lecturer on political science College for Politics, Berlin, and assistant, Department of Economics, U. of Berlin, 1931-33; prof. of sociology, Graduate Faculty of New School for Social Research, New York City, 1933-42; Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service 1942-44; propaganda policy adviser to Chief of Overseas Branch of O.W.I. 1944-45; assoc. chief, acting chief, Division for Occupied Areas, Department of State 1926-47; prof. sociology Graduate Faculty of New School for Social Research, New York City 1947-48; since 1948, chief, Social Science Division, Rand Corp., consultant to Department of State and to Research and Development Board, and member of Scientific Advisory Board.

20. Tuve, Merle A.

b. Canton, S.D., June 27, 1901; U. of Minnesota BS 1922; Johns Hopkins U. MA 1923, Ph. D. 1926; staff member and director since 1946, Carnegie Institution of Washington; chairman Section T., Office of Scientific Research and Development 1940-44; director Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins U. 1944-46

21. Wiesner, J. B.

b. Detroit, Mich., May 30, 1915; U. of Michigan BS (EE and Math.) 1937, MS (EE) 1940, Ph. D 1950; assoc. director of broadcasting, U. of Michigan 1937-40; chief engineer, Library of Congress, 1940-42; staff M.I.T. Radiation Laboratory 1942-45; staff Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory 1945-46; faculty M.I.T. since 1946; prof. of communication engineering M.I.T. since 1950; Assoc. Director, Research Laboratory of Electronics.

22. Wolff, Robert L.

b. New York, N.Y., December 22, 1915; Harvard U. AB 1936, AM 1937, Ph. D (History) 1947; teaching fellow Harvard U. 1937-41; research analyst and section chief, Office of Strategic Services and Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research 1942-46; assist. and assoc. prof. U. of Wisconsin 1947-50; on leave as visiting lecturer at Harvard 1949-50; assoc. prof. Harvard U. since 1950.

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ANNEX SEVENTEEN

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Annex 17

CONSULTANTS

In large part, the operation of Project TROY was made possible through the wealth of background information, of expert advice, and of sensitive guidance that was offered to us by men who were not formal members of the Project. The list below includes many who came to the Lexington Field Station or to Cambridge to discuss particular phases of our problem with us, and who contributed time from crowded calendars to guide us in areas of their special competence.

To include all of those within the Department of State who were of assistance to the Project would be manifestly impossible for, without exception, those whose duties within the Department brought them into contact with members of our team proved cooperative and friendly; we deeply appreciate their help. We particularly appreciate the guidance given us by those who took part in the initial briefing of the Project TROY team, the program of which is set forth in Annex 18.

Some of the men listed here as consultants were familiar with the broad outlines of the task undertaken by the Project, but in many cases the requirements of security were such as to make it advisable to discuss only limited aspects of the problem. In every case, nevertheless, they made a real contribution.

Frank Altschul, Radio Free Europe

Edwin H. Armstrong, Columbia University

Ross Bateman, Central Radio Propagation Laboratory, National Bureau of Standards

Richard M. Bissell, Jr., Economic Cooperation Administration

Henry G. Booker, Cornell University

Raymond V. Bowers, Human Resources Research Institute, Air University,
United States Air Force

Gerald B. Brophy, Office of the Under Secretary, Department of State

Ralph Clark, Central Intelligence Agency

Harlan Cleveland, Economic Cooperation Administration

R. M. Coquillette, Dewey and Almy Chemical Co.

B. R. Curtis, Collins Radio Corp.

John Davies, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State

John Devine, liaison with Project TROY, Department of State

Henry V. Dicks, Russian Research Center, Harvard University, and the RAND Corp.

Harald T. Friis, Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc.

George W. Gilman, Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc.

Col. O. L. Groves, Office of Plans and Operations, United States Air Force

George Q. Herrick, International Broadcasting Division, Department of State

Charles M. Hulten, International Information and Educational Exchange Program,
Department of State

Frank B. Jewett, Jr., General Mills Inc.

Mervin J. Kelly, Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc.

George F. Kennan, Institute for Advanced Study

Admiral Alan G. Kirk, United States Ambassador to the U.S.S.R.

Capt. Denys W. Knoll, Office of Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Foy D. Kohler, International Broadcasting Division, Department of State

Urner Liddel, Office of Naval Research, United States Navy

Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, Psychological Warfare Division, United States Army

Charles B. Moore, General Mills Inc.

Malia G. Natirbov, Division of Near East and African Affairs, Department of State

Paul H. Nitze, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State

Todos M. Odaren, Central Intelligence Agency

G. Hall Paxton, International Broadcasting Division, Department of State

Charles H. Pease, International Broadcasting Division, Department of State

A. J. Pote, Harvard University

Albert Ravenholt, Institute for Current World Affairs

Richard D. Robinson, Institute for Current World Affairs

Richard B. Roberts, Department of Terrestrial Magnetism, Carnegie Institute of
Washington

Melville J. Ruggles, Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State

Col. R. B. Sleeper, Office of Intelligence, United States Air Force

Winthrop M. Southworth, Jr., liaison with Project TROY, Department of State

William T. Stone, Interdepartmental Foreign Information Staff, Department of State

Gail L. Stubbs, Central Intelligence Agency

Davidson Taylor, liaison with Project TROY, Department of State

Adam Watson, British Embassy, Washington, D. C.

A. W. Waynick, Pennsylvania State College

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Annex 18

PROJECT TROY BRIEFING

At the very start of the Project, the team members were given an extensive briefing in the operations of the Department of State and in the broad outlines and specific details of the problems confronting them. These briefings were arranged for the State Department principally by Davidson Taylor after consultation with many sources in the Department and in other affected agencies, and for Project TROY by four members - Burnham Kelly, Max Millikan, E. E. Morison, and E. M. Purcell - who came to Washington several weeks early for this purpose.

The briefing lasted from Monday, October 23, through Friday, October 27, 1950, and was supplemented by informal sessions held by the Project team at the Wardman Park Hotel where special facilities were made available for the purpose.

The formal briefing was held in the Department of State, and attendance was limited to the members of Project TROY, those conducting the briefing, and those in the Department most intimately concerned with the Project.

The detailed program for the week follows.

Monday, October 23, 1950

10:30 a. m. - 12:00 m.	Organization Session, members of Project TROY
12:00 m.	Adjournment
2:00 - 2:30 p. m.	Edward W. Barrett, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs: <u>Statement of the Problem; Security Briefing</u>
2:30 - 3:00 p. m.	Questions
3:00 - 3:45 p. m.	Joseph B. Phillips, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs: <u>How Do We Get Our Policies? What are they? How Are They Communicated to Operators? The Nature of our Information Problem with the U.S.S.R.</u>
3:45 - 4:00 p. m.	Questions
4:00 - 4:10 p. m.	James E. Webb, Under Secretary of State: <u>Official Opening on Behalf of the Department</u>
4:10 - 4:20 p. m.	Questions
4:20 - 4:40 p. m.	Hans Speier, RAND: <u>Air Force Research Projects in This Area</u>
4:40 - 5:00 p. m.	Questions
5:00 p. m.	Adjournment

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Tuesday, October 24, 1950

Area Briefings

9:30 - 10:00 a. m.	Oliver M. Marcy, Foreign Affairs Specialist: <u>Poland</u>
10:00 - 10:30 a. m.	Questions
10:30 - 11:00 a. m.	W. Bradley Connors, Public Affairs Officer, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs: <u>China</u>
11:00 - 11:15 a. m.	Questions
11:15 - 11:45 a. m.	Alfred V. Boerner, Assistant Deputy Director, Office of Public Affairs, Office of High Commissioner of Germany: <u>Eastern Germany</u>
11:45 - 12:30 p. m.	Questions
12:30 p. m.	Adjournment
2:30 - 5:00 p. m.	Panel: Oscar C. Holder, Eastern European Affairs: <u>U.S.S.R., with Principal Emphasis on European Russia and Siberia</u> ; Stanley Wilcox, Chief, Internal Political Unit Eastern European Research Branch, and James Ramsay, Division of Research for Europe: <u>Southern Asiatic Region of the U.S.S.R.</u>
5:00 p. m.	Adjournment

Wednesday, October 25, 1950

Media Briefings

Chairman: Orville C. Anderson, Director, Office of International Information

9:00 - 9:10 a. m.	Dr. William C. Johnstone, Jr., Office of Educational Exchange: <u>Remnants of Libraries and Information Centers; Film Exhibition</u>
9:10 - 9:25 a. m.	John L. Dunning, Division of International Press and Publications: <u>Publications, Posters, Longshoremen</u>
9:25 - 9:55 a. m.	Melville J. Ruggles, Division of Research for Europe: <u>Importation of Publications into the U.S.S.R.</u>
9:55 - 10:30 a. m.	Wilmore Kendall, Office of Research Operations, United States Air Force: <u>Army Psychological Warfare Research</u>
10:30 - 10:45 a. m.	Edmund F. Becker, Office of International Trade, in Charge of Commercial Intelligence, Department of Commerce; James Somerville, Chief, Eastern European Division, Office of International Trade, Department of Commerce; Leon M. Herman, Office of International Trade, Department of Commerce: <u>Imports into the Iron Curtain Areas</u>

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Wednesday, October 25, 1950 (Cont'd)

Media Briefings (Cont'd)

10:45 - 11:00 a. m.	John M. Begg, International Information and Educational Exchange Program: <u>Direct Mail and Inserts into Imports for the Area; Foreign Advertising Plans</u>
11:00 - 12:00 m.	Discussion
12:00 m.	Adjournment
2:00 - 2:45 p. m.	Foy D. Kohler, International Broadcasting Division: <u>The Voice of America; Robert Ross, Deputy Chief of Production, Voice of America: Programs, Schedules, Policy, Content and Production</u>
2:45 - 3:30 p. m.	Questions
3:30 - 4:00 p. m.	Leo Lowenthal and Marjorie Fiske Lissance: <u>Whom Are We reaching by Radio, and How Do We Know</u>
4:00 - 4:30 p. m.	Questions
5:00 - 6:00 p. m.	R. G. Barnes, Policy Reports Staff: <u>The Global Situation</u>

Thursday, October 26, 1950

Media Briefings

9:00 - 9:30 a. m.	Fred H. Trimmer, Chief, Broadcast Frequency Unit, Program Planning and Evaluation Staff: <u>International Problems of Frequency Allocations</u>
9:30 - 10:00 a. m.	Questions
10:00 - 11:00 a. m.	George Herrick, Chief, and Charles Pease, Executive Engineer, Facilities Division, International Broadcasting Division: <u>Technical Problems of the Voice of America: Transmitters, Receivers, Jamming</u>
11:00 a. m. - 12:00 m.	Questions
12:00 m.	Adjournment
	<u>Related Agencies</u>
2:00 - 2:15 p. m.	William T. Stone, Chief, Interdepartmental Foreign Information Staff: <u>The Interdepartmental Foreign Information Service</u>
2:15 - 2:30 p. m.	Questions
2:30 - 3:30 p. m.	George Herrick, International Broadcasting Division, and Peter Mero, Central Intelligence Agency: <u>Receivers</u>

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Thursday, October 26, 1950 (Cont'd)

Related Agencies (Cont'd)

3:30 - 3:50 p. m.

Jesse M. MacKnight, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs: Cooperation with Non-Governmental Organizations, and Liaison with Other Governmental Branches

3:50 - 4:10 p. m.

Questions

4:10 - 4:40 p. m.

Joseph Kolarek, Office of European Regional Affairs: Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary, Albania

4:40 - 4:00 p. m.

Questions

5:00 p. m.

Adjournment

Friday, October 27, 1950

Related Agencies (Cont'd)

9:00 - 11:00 a. m.

Admiral L. C. Stevens, U. S. Navy, Joint Subsidiary Plans Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff

11:00 - 12:00 m.

Col. D. N. Wackwitz, Air Force Intelligence: Morale of Russian Forces

12:00 m.

Adjournment

2:00 - 3:00 p. m.

George H. Butler, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State: Our Foreign Policy Objectives With Respect to the Soviet Controlled Area, and the Role of Communications Policy in Achieving Them

3:00 - 3:30 p. m.

Questions

3:30 p. m.

Adjournment

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